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Synopsis 
This paper adopts the idea that nationally observed commemorative events are pivotal in 
the enactment of identity. Exemplified by Anzac Day, collective mnemonic narratives are 
implicated in the process of producing particular conceptions of what is normative and 
valued within a legal and political community. The notion of collective memory’s 
contribution to the production of normative and formative frames, and associated senses of 
belonging and recognition, is brought into conversation with the theorisation of the 
plurality of law.  Interview data from a project examining the experiences of expatriate 
homosexual Australian men is introduced in order to explore the entanglement of Anzac 
Day commemoration and law in the elastic quality of normative frames to tolerate 
difference while also being inherently exclusionary. 
 
Introduction 
This paper argues that collective memory plays an important role in mediating senses 
people have of law, lawfulness, and legality, and can be identified as an actor implicated 
in the process by which law comes to take on particular functions and meanings in 
society. As such, it can be thought of as a quasi-legal institution.1 Collective memory, as 
                                                             
1 This follows Levine and Mellema (2001), who argue that experiences of law rely, too, on norms and forces 
which can be considered extra-legal or quasi-legal. Collective memory is rendered here as an ‘institution’ 
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one site at which normativity is enacted, contributes to the processes of meaning-making 
that structures the inclusions and exclusions of the law. In order to establish this 
argument, this paper builds on literature that identifies the law’s processual, plural, and 
distributed character(s),2 thus rationalising an appreciation of the legal and political 
textures of institutions which may, hitherto, have been considered non-legal. Moreover, 
this literature feeds into, and is fed by, an impression of law as an ongoing product of 
affective relations.3 In other words, under investigation here is the power of collective 
memory, as an affective and emotionally textured practice, to contribute to the 
production of normative and formative frames4 and senses of legality and belonging. 
 
The argument that this process of meaning-making—and law’s ability to construct or 
sustain a particular order or be recognised as operable—incorporates the role of 
collective memory, and its normalising and formalising function, has three interwoven 
threads which are developed throughout the paper. First, law and regulatory practices 
enable the conditions in which a mnemonic narrative is established.  They contribute to 
the conditions of normativity that come to define and buttress the sense of a plural self: 
a collective ‘we’.5 For instance, the officially sanctioned silencing of homosexuality from 
the armed forces has a significant impact on the way the history of Australian military 
history is remembered. Second, law itself depends for its success and justification on 
social and moral attitudes6 which can be contingent on, and bound up in, the formation 
and maintenance of collective memory. This particular point underscores the work that 
                                                             
to convey the regularised and established practice of particular mnemonhistorical narratives as being a key 
feature of a group identity. 
2 Melissaris (2009), Davies (2017). 
3 See eg Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2015). 
4 See eg Assmann (2011). 
5 Lindahl (2010). 
6 Hertogh (2018). 
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needs to be done, and continually redone, ‘alongside’ the law. Such work is readily 
identifiable in the social, rhetorical, economic, and political milieus which normalise, and 
help stimulate popular support for legislative and policy assaults on, for example, welfare, 
immigration, and foreign aid.  
 
Equally, this work is needed for progressive legal reform, too; without critically engaging 
with the features of these quasi-legal institutions which sustain a legal and political 
orthodoxy, they remain complicit in the process of remaking the approved paradigm. This 
feeds into the third thread, that the emotive, affective, and sensorial aspects of law are 
identifiable among quasi-legal institutions which can contribute to the making or 
unmaking of belonging. Following Roberto Esposito’s notion that community, or senses 
of obligation through community attachment, is a condition of law,7 and the notion that 
communities are ‘ready-made outlets for prejudice and excessive emotionalism,’8 
identifying the quasi-legal institutions and actors bound up in this emotive process of 
community-making is a task of legal significance. 
 
This paper suggests that the commemoration of Anzac Day is identified as one such quasi-
legal institution, affecting the way in which law is given meaning for different people in 
society.  Anzac Day is a commemorative event implicated in the construction of a sense 
of national identity in Australia as well as constituting a deeply exclusionary narrative, 
entangled in the representation of an idealised Australian as a tough, militarised, 
heterosexual, masculine, white male.  In this paper, I focus on the exclusion of 
homosexuality from this normative register.  While others have shown how the narrative 
                                                             
7 Esposito (2013). 
8 Blackshaw (2010), p.21. 
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frame of Anzac Day can alter law’s understanding of such things as homophobic violence,9 
I draw on the meaning of Anzac Day through interviews with seven homosexual 
Australian men, aiming to show the role an institution such as the commemoration of 
Anzac Day can play in enacting legal meaning. In focusing on Anzac Day, the interviews 
consider the deeply masculine evolution of Australian nationalism,10 steeped as it is in 
early 20th century conflict, with the Australian men who fought revered as the typification 
of Australian-ness.11 The sense-making nature of the interviews has presented data 
which help demonstrate the characterisation of law as dependent on quasi-legal 
institutions and illustrate the elastic quality of both ‘progressive’ legislation12 and non-
state law foundations of norm, order, and belonging. 
 
Belonging beyond the law 
The idea that what can be thought of as the operation of law extends well beyond the 
formal and privileged understanding of ‘the law’ and legal decision has enabled us to 
readily move beyond seeing law (only) as a centralised, organised, and coherent body of 
rules. Ranging from understanding law as constituted by, and reliant on, a variety of social 
practices and actors13 to recognising discrete ways in which legal mechanisms impact 
upon both complex and mundane social interactions14 opens up the possibility of 
                                                             
9 Philadelphoff-Puren and Rush (2003). 
10 Despite the Anzac legend encompassing both Australia and New Zealand, the focus of this paper is solely 
on Australia; the observance of, and attitudes towards, Anzac Day in each country is tempered by specific 
social and political conditions, both contemporary and at the time. 
11 Damousi & Lake (1995a).  
12 Broadly within this century and the final quarter of the last century, Australia has enacted a range of 
legislation, both federally and by state, extending rights and recognition to its LGBT population. 
Notwithstanding decriminalisation and criminal justice provisions, this legislation has tended to cover 
family life, concerning succession, adoption, family planning, and marriage & partnership recognition, 
reaffirming normative and generative relationship logics. 
13 Ewick & Silbey (1998). 
14 Valverde (2012). 
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convincingly tracing the legal effects of institutions which are ostensibly non-legal.15 One 
critical extension to this idea is the notion that the formal institution of ‘law’ and legal 
decision making can conceal pervasive inequalities, obscured as they are by the ongoing 
fallacy that law is fairly modelled on detachment and neutrality. While it is true that law’s 
own appeal to convince us of its universality sees it no longer formally expressing gender, 
race, sexuality, and class distinctions, the perceived singularity and self-contained logic 
of law is, in fact, embedded in a multitude of practices which result in the production of a 
normative standard on which the law rests. This standard is defined, according to 
Margaret Davies, as ‘a convergence of behaviour, of discourse, of meaning, 
symbolisations, or of actions, which exerts a gravitational pull on surrounding events and 
meanings, and is often read into them as an unquestioned presumption.’16 
 
In other words, mainstream state-based law not only derives ‘from plural sources [and] 
relies upon plural modes of reasoning’ but ‘interacts in complex and contradictory ways 
with a plurality of social, ideological and political systems of significance.’17 We are, 
instinctively, aware of this; if the law was hierarchical, vertically effective, and clearly 
centred, then the morality and virtue of law(s) would be self-defining. However, ‘the law’ 
is made in a constant process whereby it oscillates between, on the one hand, being 
heavily contingent on the distributed contest for defining a norm in which it can 
successfully be situated and, on the other hand, itself contributing to this (re)definition 
and being instrumental in formalising this norm as ‘the law’ within the confines of its own 
                                                             
15 Fleur Johns (2013) identifies various taxonomies of non-legal; it is defined as illegal, extra-legal, pre- or 
post-legal, supra- or infra-legal. Each of these suggest a definite distinction from law. The ‘ostensibly’ non-
legal institutions I am referring to in this paper, particularly in relation to mnemonic institutions, can more 
appropriately be considered quasi-legal to reflect how closely bound up these institutions are in the process 
of making legal order. 
16 Davies (2017), p.37. 
17 Davies (2005), p.92. 
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legal rationality. In the context of marriage equality, for instance, the law’s framing is not 
in and of itself successful but is responsive to the distributed network of other actors, 
events, and institutions which have identified this as socially tolerable. However, law is 
similarly complicit in determining the limits of the inclusion of hitherto excluded conduct 
within its boundaries, providing for the state recognition of relationships which fit within 
the pre-existing marriage paradigm and/or capturing those who are not otherwise 
compelled by this sole conceptualisation of marriage because it is the limit of the legal 
recognition being offered.18  
 
This is an example of the elasticity of legal belonging. While such elasticity cannot be 
spatialised as a pulling from a fixed focal point, given the distributedness of institutions 
and sites at which normativity is contested and enacted, it articulates an inevitable limit 
to law’s tolerance (or ability) to capture deviations from its previous standards. Similarly, 
there is an inevitable limit to social tolerance of deviations from what has previously been 
considered ‘normal’ within the social order which, in this instance, is evidenced in no 
small part by how substantial the minority ‘No’ vote was and how rancorous the marriage 
equality postal survey was. In relation to law, Hans Lindahl would suggest that the limits 
of its tolerance is an inescapable feature, that there may well be something—the a-legal—
which ‘demands the actualization of practical possibilities that are incompossible with 
the range of possibilities available to a collective [legal order] as its possibilities.’19  
 
In other words, its inability to conceptualise that which exists beyond the purview of its 
own in/out, legal/illegal distinction means the law is continually having to develop to 
                                                             
18 Duggan (2003), Ammaturo (2014). 
19 Lindahl (2013), p.6. 
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incorporate and recognise that which it previously did not, or could not, conceptualise; 
this is a slow, iterative process by which law responds to plural social and political orders 
and norms. The idea that ‘the interference wrought by a-legality is not eo ipse an 
existential threat to a legal collective’20 highlights that the contest for actualising a-legal 
claims does not necessarily destabilise the legal order but, as this paper argues, can 
proliferate, and be determined, within quasi-legal institutions. 
 
The notion of legal plurality, beyond ‘the law’, rests on expansive and uninhibited 
approaches which enable legality to be read into social encounter.21 Underpinning such 
approaches is a concern with mapping how everyday conditions produce and have an 
effect on our lives. One such approach is the insistence that language is not imbued with 
a logic independent from material form; rather, each has permeable frontiers and are 
related by way of ascription and affect.22 Opening up legal theory to acknowledge law’s 
contingency on the litany of non-textual actors invites us to understand that law thrives, 
and emerges, in an assortment of institutions, events, encounters, emotional connections, 
and situations. The idea of law as atmosphere, and the ‘“perfect” dissimulation’ which 
nourishes our desires, creates frames of belonging, and ‘feeds our ways of living and ends 
up determining the human’23 is, in many ways, a reconfiguration of the notion of 
obligations which are bestowed upon us by the juridical order.  
 
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ thesis is that the notion of a juridical order 
expressing such ‘obligations’ is better expressed as a collection of diffuse practices, 
                                                             
20 Lindahl (2013), p.179. 
21 See eg Cowan & Carr (2016). 
22 Keane (2005), Conaghan (2013) 
23 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2015), p.107. 
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concealed in the ordinary and affective matter we encounter during our everyday lives, 
which effects normative compulsions, rather than obligations. While it is important to 
account for this distributed and ever-present feature of the juridical order, as one feature 
of the cyclical process it is important to still account for the complicity of what is readily 
and commonly understood as ‘the law’ as part of this process, with its own peremptory 
quality. As such, Lindahl’s distinction between the legal order and political plurality is 
useful to reintroduce here, as it enables obligation and normative compulsion to be 
dissociated from one another, while letting both retain importance. However, reading 
Davies and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos together acts as a useful reminder to be 
cognisant of quasi-legal techniques which are implicated in the process of norm- and law-
making. Indeed, this paper argues that memory should be accounted for in this, as it acts 
as a device which helps characterise lawfulness, normalcy, ‘right’, and belonging. 
 
Devyani Prabhat acknowledges the importance of this when she suggests that 
emotionality and the personal experience of law are often absent from the analysis. 
Writing in relation to the field of migration and nationality laws, she states that hearing 
personal accounts, and emphasising the emotional textures of law, helps us to more 
readily understand concepts such as our senses of belonging and consciousness of law 
because ‘the complexities are about the emotive component of people’s loves rather than 
merely their physical dislocations.’24 Beyond the concrete and readily accessible 
moments of formal recognition and the legal decision to, for example, grant citizenship, is 
the ongoing, and messily constructed, quasi-legal determination of belonging, through the 
feelings of comfort and positive perception, on the one hand, and the converse, on the 
                                                             
24 Prabhat (2018), p.29. 
9 
 
other. The distinction one can make between decision and determination, while 
acknowledging their shared importance and that they interweave, follows the distinction 
between obligation and normative compulsion.  
 
There are, of course, three determinations that can be accounted for which render state 
legality and legal decision either meaningful or meaningless. The following are each 
characteristic of the notion that ‘official state law is in constant competition with 
normative frameworks and rules of non-state law’.25 First, the determination that, in 
conjunction with or notwithstanding ‘the law’, I sense that I (do not) belong. Second, and 
similarly dissociable from ‘the law’, I sense that others believe I (do not) belong. Third, 
others feel I (do not) belong. In other words, senses of (un)belonging which are mediated 
by normative frameworks can be inconsistent with the apparent definitiveness of more 
progressive and inclusive state law. Each of the above motifs appears within the data 
generated from sense-making and reflective interviews, touching on the role of collective 
memory as one of these normative frameworks and a source of non-state law, which this 
paper articulates as a quasi-legal institution, in helping foster a sense of belonging and 
buttress particular societal norms.  
 
The relationship between law and memory has, in recent years, been closely examined.26 
However, the focus of much of this literature has, principally, been on examining the role 
law plays in the determination of memory. This literature extends from identifying legal 
concepts, actions, and institutions as determinative resources of remembering and 
forgetting27 to identifying the important role played by the law in the formal 
                                                             
25 Hertogh (2018), p.180. 
26 Karstedt (2009); Belavusau & Gliszczyńska-Grabias (2017). 
27 Christodolidis & Veitch (2009). 
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consolidation and functionalisation of memory.28 But a further insight can be obtained by 
acknowledging that collective memory narratives can be implicated in the processes of 
community-making upon which the law is founded.  Attending to the experience of 
individuals in relation to these narratives of commemoration can shed light on the gap 
separating formal legal developments, such as the progressive narrative of greater 
inclusion in the law, from the real mechanisms which determine one’s relationship to 
community, one’s effective belonging or not to a political body and thus the symbolic 
place one has before the law.  The implication of memory in the process of making sense 
of one’s place in a particular social and political environment is a consistent theme within 
the interviews in this study and gives an indication of the significance of quasi-legal 
institutions that can emerge around such things as the commemoration of Anzac Day.  
 
Method 
The interviews, conducted separately with seven participants, were led by a single 
question that was asked of all participants: how do you make sense of Anzac Day? Beyond 
this, the interviews were unstructured and there was minimal intervention from the 
interviewer.29 Participants were encouraged to take time to reflect on personal 
experience and vocalise the process by which insights emerged in response to the initial 
question. Arising out of the process by which participants made sense of their personal 
experiences were reflections on where and how belonging, identity formation, and law 
featured. Such an approach, which encourages participant sense-making, reflects the 
exploration of perceptions of belonging and consciousness of law, and operates within 
                                                             
28 Löytömäki (2012). 
29 This method is based heavily on principles found within the approach taken to interviews in 
interpretative phenomenological analysis. See eg Smith (2004); Smith, Flowers, & Larkin (2009); Smith & 
Osborn (2008). 
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the socio-legal insistence on exploring the extra- and quasi-legal sources of normativity 
and law. A method which offers means by which people can reflect on the processes of 
identity formation, belonging, citizenship, and community,30 is a necessarily inductive 
process, and the intention of this work is to ‘construct broader research questions which 
lead to the collection of expansive data’31 and prompt additional inquiry.32 As such, the 
purpose of the interviews, and this paper, is to suggest a number of themes, factors, and 
experiences which can come to constitute law or render it perceptible, within the 
theoretical positioning of law as open and pervasive. 
 
The idiographic features of the interviews conducted—ie with a small number of 
participants with a high degree of sample homogeneity—feeds into the exploratory steps 
this study can take, addressing the detail of individual cases which means we may, 
tentatively, be able to indicate a degree of commonality in the way law and senses of 
belonging within a community are manifested. The small sample size also enables close 
consideration of the themes introduced within each individual’s narrative. Each of the 
interviewees were Australian members of gay-inclusive rugby teams in the UK. Those 
participating were young–middle-aged, gay, ex-patriate, Australian, men. While 
expatriates may approach issues of identity and belonging in different ways than 
residents of Australia, limiting the study in this way offers a unique perspective. It 
guaranteed a degree of distance of participants, both spatially and temporally, from 
formative years in Australia. It also enabled a more reflective tone to be struck in the 
participants’ recording of their own experiences and development. While these 
reflections cannot be generalisable, the way in which they contemplatively address Anzac 
                                                             
30 See eg Mulveen & Hepworth (2006); Munroe, Hammond, & Cole (2016). 
31 Smith (2004), p.43. 
32 Rather than the pursuit of closure of satisfaction of a particular assumption. Smith & Osborn (2008). 
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Day and their sexuality within their accounts prompts a tentative mapping of belonging. 
Incidentally, the fact that each were rugby players feeds into the interrogation of the 
complex relationship between sexuality and gender stereotypes in Australia; how this is 
bound up in the commemoration of Anzac Day and the valorisation of masculinity and 
gender stereotypes; and the entanglement of law in this process. 
 
Analysis 
Each of the participants, in one way or another, addressed Anzac Day as being of 
fundamental importance. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given the fact that the Anzac 
legend—for Australians, at least—revolves around the suggestion that the landing of 
Australian troops at Gallipoli on the morning of 25th April 1915 heralded the 
entrenchment of a sense of Australian-ness and the birth of the Australian nation (or, at 
least, the coming of age of Australia as a nation on the international stage). Moreover, 
public commemorative events are often considered to have a constitutive function, acting 
as a means of enabling communities to orient themselves around common, standardising 
features.33 The emotional quality of collective memories facilitates a normative claim 
about heritage to be emulated;34 obligations to be satisfied;35 and a linear trajectory to be 
imagined from the past, through the present, and into future projections.36 As such, 
collective memory is entangled in the process of boundary making, identity formation, 
and the framing of belonging.37 
 
                                                             
33 Carter & Sealey (2007). 
34 Olick & Robbins (1998). 
35 Assmann (2011). 
36 Reif-Hüsler (2012); Schwarz (2012). 
37 McCormack (2011); Assmann & Shortt (2012); Moreton-Robinson (2015); Abazi & Doja (2018). 
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In this respect, Anzac Day is deeply implanted in the legal and political consciousness of 
Australians.38 Indeed, one participant, Zackary,39 volunteered a great deal of 
embarrassment that he was not as well-versed on the legend as he should have been 
‘because it’s supposed to be such a, a revered sort of day for our culture.’ Another 
participant, Owen, queried what he could bring to the project when considering whether 
to participate for the same reason. In general, three interviewees talk about the profound 
collective importance of Anzac Day, another talked about its deep personal importance, 
and one was more equivocal but acknowledged its importance to the community. Ben 
reflects that: 
 
I think a lot of people do have a connection to Anzac in the way that they teach it 
to you and it’s very, you know, this is Australia. This is what we did. This is who 
we were helping out. So, I think it’s, yeah, a lot of– just about national pride 
probably, and knowing, yeah, knowing that you’re part of the country and your 
family contributed to that. 
 
This reflects the importance of a sense of familial lineage within a narrative of shared 
significance which is, of course, deeply exclusionary to immigrant Australians (which is 
perhaps why the two interviewees who gave a much clearer account of their non-white, 
first- and second-generation immigrant status were less effusive about the importance of 
Anzac Day to them). Moreover, the narrative is deeply racialised: the stress on the Anzac 
role in, as Clark says, ‘stand[ing] up for their right to, one, freedom, but freedom from 
authoritarianism’ is, as Owen suggests, presented in school as, broadly, ‘we shouldn’t be 
                                                             
38 See eg Lake (2010); Daley (2018). 
39 All interviewees names have been anonymised. 
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taking anything for granted [ . . . ] it w-, c-, would have been a very different country had 
the Japanese taken over part of it.’40 The interviews also suggest that Anzac Day is, for the 
participants, similarly gendered and sexualised. The representation of sexuality in Anzac 
Day is not as immediately tied to familial provenance as race; this privilege is 
reintroduced in the analysis of the elasticity of the Anzac narrative and Australia—and 
tolerance of homosexuality within both—as is the way in which this feeds into the 
elasticity of law and tolerance of homosexuality within it. 
 
In relation to law, it is perhaps interesting to note that, in all but one of the interviews, 
reflections on how the law was fed into the conversation about sexuality and Anzac 
featured only very briefly (and the other did not reflect on law at all). When it did feature, 
however, it was identified either as part of the process of fostering a more comfortable 
social environment or limited by social, political, and cultural conditions. Two 
participants, Zackary and Shawn, identified that, beyond the certainty of legal 
technicalities and decisions, questions of belonging, ‘fitting in’, and feeling comfortable 
with oneself and others needed to be accounted for. In much that same way that Prabhat 
reminds us that ‘a variety of positions on being, and becoming citizens, and on 
experiencing belonging, can be traced as part of a membership continuum’,41 Zackary 
reflects on the meaning that exists beyond legal fact when talking about his Australian 
citizenship: 
 
                                                             
40 See also Wadham (2013). 
41 Prabhat (2018), p.124. See also Sutherland (2017). 
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Apologies for having an existential crisis here, but [laughing] I don’t know what 
my identity is. Am I Australian? Am I still Australian? Was I ever Australian? What 
makes me that? I have a passport but, you know, what does that mean? 
 
Of course, the decoupling of legal status from how one feels about one’s identity is not 
necessarily an uncommon feeling, particularly as a gay man in a country widely perceived 
as being dependent on a robust, hyper-masculine, heteronormative ideal. What is 
particularly interesting is the directness with which Zackary links his feeling of 
unbelonging with Anzac: ‘my family never went to, uh, any sort of parades, any, any, 
marches. Yes, I suppose sometimes I, I don’t feel Australian.’ The link between Anzac and 
the conceptualisation of Australian-ness is, unsurprisingly, a common theme across all 
seven interviews and while not all participants directly brought Anzac and sexuality into 
conversation, all seven identified their sexuality as conflicting with the “ideal”, and 
archetypal, Australian identity. 
 
Returning to the positioning of law within the interviews, the mediation of belonging 
beyond law is also accounted for. For instance, Owen, who recognises that his mother’s 
inability to picture attending his wedding, should marriage equality happen,42 is more 
significant than any legalisation with regards to his sense of happiness and belonging. 
Conversely, two other participants, Aaron and John, briefly identified the value of legal 
recognition for fostering more inclusive social and cultural attitudes, with John43 
recalling: 
                                                             
42 He recounts this conversation during the stages after coming out to his parents, and before marriage 
equality was legislated for in Australia. 
43 At 53, John was the oldest participant interviewed, and was in his early 20s in the period when male 
homosexuality was decriminalised in New South Wales and remained criminalised in Queensland. 
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New South Wales had Mardi Gras. Queensland you were beaten up and sent to 
prison by the police. Yeah, it certainly had a sense of safety that you never felt in 
Queensland, cos everything was illicit, and everything was underground, and you 
were cruising the weirdest places. 
 
Even when accounting for the gay bashings, aggravated assaults, and murders in the more 
legislatively progressive New South Wales, John suggests that ‘it still felt safer than 
Queensland, if that makes sense. But it did, it honestly felt safer because at least the police 
were on your side and, and you were, you were a legal entity.’ Sandwiched between these 
two readings of law into participant accounts is the account of Ben, who identifies 
instances such as the (very) recent legalisation of gay marriage as an indication that 
‘[Australia is] still such a backwards country.’44 He situates this in the broader context of 
Australia’s profound comfort in ‘straight man, straight woman; that’s it’ and the 
conflation of male heterosexuality and masculinity. The issue of masculinity as a core 
theme within the interviews will be developed in further detail. Beyond this, the two 
other common themes identified across each interview are: the issue of representation 
of sexual and gender minorities in Australia (and Anzac), and the importance of certain, 
“typical”, conduct for establishing comfort (of the self and others) with being an 
Australian homosexual. The latter of these is examined as a process of ‘elasticity and 
tolerance’. 
 
Representation 
                                                             
44 This sentiment is also touched upon by Shawn, who states that ‘we only got same sex marriage last year, 
um, well behind the rest of the Western World, shall we say.’ 
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One of the most meaningful themes to participants, when talking about their experience 
of growing up in Australia, was the distinct lack of cultural and media depiction of 
homosexuality, whether it was in relation to sporting heroes or on television. The value 
of this was made clear by Owen, when recounting his frustration that Australian Olympic 
swimmer, Ian Thorpe, had publicly denied his homosexuality when competing: 
 
We’re the, we’re the same age and it would have been really helpful I reckon, 
especially for me to feel more comfortable in my skin, as if someone like that, in a 
position of being an idol to the country, to actually come out during his peak, and 
say, he was gay. 
 
Being able to positively identify that national idols can be, and are, gay is considered vital 
to a sense of belonging, self-value, and pride in one’s country. For instance, Ben laments: 
 
And none of their, you know, none of the people you remember or you, you know, 
in any of those—in Anzac day—or any of those days and people that teach you 
about heroes and all the people you learn about, like all the sporting people, like, 
there’s… I don’t think there’s a single gay player in any sport in Australia at the 
moment. I mean, there is, but not that they’ve told anyone. So, I don’t know. Yeah, 
it’s still quite, yeah, one sexuality and that’s it. 
 
In other words, the equation is fairly straightforward; education and representation 
prefigure recognition. Throughout his interview, Ben talks through his understanding of 
war and Anzac through sport, so it is unsurprising that he relates the lack of awareness 
of gay men within the Anzac legend with a lack of current openly gay sportsmen. The lack 
18 
 
of awareness, growing up, of gay Anzacs who could be readily identified as such was also 
mentioned by Clark. While authors such as Yorick Smaal are making a concerted effort to 
reveal the realities of homosexuality within the services which are hitherto left concealed, 
poorly documented, and obliquely touched upon,45 there is still a degree of reticence to 
acknowledge the full extent to which homosexuals are identified as serving (and thus, 
militarised, valorised, idolised). 
 
This is, of course, one problem of grounding the ‘truth’ of Anzac Day, or any memory, in 
official records. In relation to WWI, this was the manifest objective of the official war 
correspondent, Charles Bean. The cultivation of this officialised version of Anzac history, 
which has since been recirculated in books, films, documentaries, television dramas, and 
educational resources, has built, for Australia, the ‘truest history which was ever 
written’46 that just so happens to exclude homosexuality. This is because, should 
opportunities for homosexuals to meet others within the services, given the homosocial 
organisation of life in the services, be taken advantage of, they would have been officially 
forbidden from declaring themselves.47 Informally, psychological or social explanations 
(ie illness or ‘deprivation homosexuality’) were given for known homosexuality and 
sexual acts between men within the services.  
 
The even more definitive action of discharging men who were found to have engaged in 
sexual activities with other men ‘on medical grounds—with the reason not recorded—
                                                             
45 Smaal (2015). See also Riseman, Robinson, & Willett (2018) for a collection of stories which confront the 
official, political, and cultural silencing of the service of LGBT personnel in the Australian Defence Force. 
46 Condé (2007), p.39, quoting Bean. 
47 Lake & Damousi (1995). 
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rather than charged or disciplinary action taken’48 meant that homosexuality was kept 
absent from ‘official records’ and, thus, goes unmentioned in the canonical and 
foundational texts of the Anzac legend. Moreover, this lack of documentation of 
homosexuality among Australian service personnel was compounded by the policy, at 
various times in the history of the Australian forces, that ‘disciplinary action would only 
be taken when the homosexual acts were in public, involved a sexual assault, involved a 
minor or if there was a power imbalance in rank.’49 This means that the only homosexual 
acts which would publicly and officially be bound to the services are acts which would, in 
any other context, be met with moral and/or legal condemnation or judgment, thus 
providing a fundamental misrepresentation. 
 
The litany of ‘pop’ and ‘high’ culture which deploy official historical accounts of Anzac 
Day, in order to structure their mnemonic narratives, only serves to entrench a particular 
truth. Within this mnemonic narrative, and the significance of Australian reverence of 
military heroism, it is problematic that LGBT history within the Anzac legend has been 
given negligible official recognition. It is problematic because bounded communities, 
determined in part by sensorial and affective quasi-legal institutions such as collective 
memory, can be the foundation of bigotry, violence, and fear against those that are 
unrecognisable50 or non-identified.51 It is certainly important to account for the work that 
needs to be done to make normative and formative quasi-legal institutions more 
representative and progressive, given the role they play in giving sense to belonging 
                                                             
48 Ford (1995), p.95. See Smaal & Willett (2015) and Riseman (2018) who suggest similar policies existed 
in WWII and the post-Vietnam era policy, respectively. 
49 Riseman (2018), p.152. See also Smaal & Willett (2015). 
50 See eg Butler (2009) 
51 See eg Ojakangas (2003). 
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within a legal and political community. That is not to say that some degree of progress is 
not perceived as being made. Aaron, for instance, suggests that:  
 
And, especially like the Shrine of Remembrance, you know, the Australian War 
Memorial, all of that, they’re starting to show there was diversity in the nation at 
the time. It wasn’t just white, heterosexual men [ . . . ] now we’ve been able to chip 
away at this image of macho, macho butch heterosexual white Anzacs, and be able 
to go, some of them were gay. 
 
Similarly, Clark identifies that there was an important shift from a silent population of 
homosexual servicemen who, while in uniform, were suppressing their sexuality: 
 
To then, just as I was leaving, it wasn't just, oh my god, I've just been at a Dawn 
Service and I'm going to sneak into The Stonewall, but fuck it, you guys, all of you 
gays, we're going to the, we're going to The Stonewall, we're going to celebrate, 
and we're going to be acknowledged for the fact that it wasn't just straight people 
that were Anzacs, but also the gays that were Anzacs, as well. And we're gay, and 
we're military, and we respect our forebears.  
 
This is, indeed, an important step and one which conforms to the linearity and ability to 
identify provenance expected of a collective mnemonic narrative. Notwithstanding this, 
there is still a lot of work to do, in relation to normalising the representation of 
homosexuality in the military.52 Of course, some of the most vociferous rejection of gay 
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representation from the military, and the rhetoric rationalising violent retaliation against 
homosexuality appearing within the RSL53 and in legal judgment,54 is not distant history. 
Furthermore, the deeply masculinist bent that military reverence takes means that the 
question of homosexual recognition also has to contend with the common stereotypical 
representation of homosexuals as effeminate or as over the top drag queens.55 Indeed, 
the idealisation of masculinity as a fundamentally Australian trait to be revered was 
highlighted as a core challenge to participants when growing up. 
 
Masculinity 
‘The Australian male is a very macho beast.’ So summarises John. It is a depiction of 
Australian manhood which each of my interviewees identified. Beyond this, though, 
effeminacy was considered to rank, according to Zackary, ‘in the hierarchy, far less than 
masculinity.’ The essentialised distinction between effeminacy and masculinity—
overlaid with the distinction between homo- and hetero-sexual, respectively—as well as 
the identification of typically masculine attitudes, activities, and characteristics are key 
features of each interview. The pervasiveness of masculinity across a number of cultural 
performances is exemplified by Zackary, who uses Australian expressions and typical 
manners of speaking to bind his reflections on the interaction between the foundations 
of Australian culture, Australian values, sexuality, and gender stereotypes. He suggests 
that one culturally significant ‘value’ within Australia is the prevalence of ‘tall poppy 
syndrome’, or the derogation of high achievers as ‘assholes’ and ‘smart asses’ (‘they all 
                                                             
53 Nicoll (2001). 
54 Philadelphoff-Puren & Rush (2003). 
55 Two participants in particular, Zackary and Shawn, mention growing up with only The Adventures of 
Priscilla, Queen of the Desert as a reference for how homosexuals were characterised. 
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kind of yeah, tear each other down, you know, in a joking way. And make fun of people 
who are, I don’t know? I’d say better or, or they, they see as better’).56  
 
The reflection on tall poppy syndrome is an important feature of Zackary’s story as he 
goes on to link this with the experience of growing up in Australia as a gay man, and the 
conflation of gender stereotypes and caricatures of sexuality: 
 
Um, at least, yeah, when I, when I was a, a kid, you know, growing up as a teenager, 
they would be really slim, effeminate, limp wristed, talk with a lisp, you know, or, 
or something. Or talk in a really prissy uh, you know. Even a British accent 
sometimes. I think for some reason they’re all, they all sound really British. I, sorry, 
I, I, I’d [laughing] I’ve, I hope that’s not offensive. 
 
The caution against me, as a Brit, taking offence at the link being made between a British 
accent and the suggestion of homosexuality is, itself, an intriguing statement to make as 
it suggests that any implication of effeminacy is something to take offence at. Zackary 
goes on to explain that: 
 
I think, I think for a lot of gay guys, it’s, it’s, it’s an, it’s a way of I don’t know? Being 
more precise? Maybe they have a more precise way of speaking and that’s closer 
to British than Australian? Because it’s you know what Australian ways of 
speaking are typically– everything’s slurred, lazy, drawn out. Does that make 
sense? […] I think we’d make fun of people that sounded that way. Possibly 
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because they sound gay, possibly because they sound like they’re being posh, 
better than they are. 
 
The desire not to be seen as posh or elitist is related to the tendency for Australians to 
back the underdog, and Zackary also relates it back to jokes about the country’s convict 
past and—on reflection—also speculatively back to the unsuccessful Gallipoli. At this 
point, the entanglement of Australian cultural values and perceptions of how one’s 
sexuality may fit within this configuration begins to emerge. The speculative rooting of 
Australian linguistic norms in Anzac Day, alongside the principles of egalitarianism and 
tall poppy syndrome, sees sexuality characterised for judgment, in Zackary’s opinion, 
alongside elitism. The tying together of the masculine ideal and Anzac Day is articulated 
more directly by several other participants. Aaron suggests that homosexuality, as a 
minority grouping within Australia, was possibly the hardest for people to accept, 
‘specially with Anzacs, because the, the diggers were, for so long, represented and 
portrayed as macho, macho, butch guys.’ The common trope of associating masculinity 
with heterosexuality is unhesitatingly read into the armed forces. Furthermore, Owen, 
mentions that the Anzacs were archetypal Australians, in that they were: 
 
Kind of like your every, everyday Australian, kind of like the larrikin, easy-going, 
no-worries kind of people. Uh, really good blokes. And that’s, uh, and is probably 
the term bloke is ridiculously [laughs] heterosexual. I’ll probably say actually, 
because it is supposed to be, like it is very masculine, like uh, um, you know, 
blokey-blokey kind of, all the guys down at the pub after playing a game of footy, 
or kind of, uh, who does embody that. 
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In comparable terms, a link between the services and masculinity is made by Clark, who 
suggests that his decision to join the cadets ‘would actually help to make [him] a mature 
adult [ . . . ] and also in terms of what would make [him] a man’ reinforces the idea of the 
serviceman as the archetypal, masculine, man. This archetype is readily translatable into 
a repeatable commemorative narrative which acts as an apparatus or condition which 
rationalises what being a man, and normatively masculine, means.57 The fact that the 
armed forces are so readily commemorated as the source of national pride or character 
is deeply problematic because the Australian narrative of war is saturated with the virtue 
of the hyper-masculine and heroic soldier.58  
 
Moreover, as Carmel Shute argues, WWI affirmed the traditional sexual stereotypes of 
men, and that the extolling of ‘the “manly” virtues of the soldier, as opposed to the 
“weakness”, “cowardice” and effeminacy” of the stay-at-home “shirker”, was a frequently 
used vehicle for psychological manipulation of men’59 into war. Furthermore, the lack of 
education at the time on sexuality in general, not to mention homosexuality, meant that 
sex and gender could often be conflated, as were maleness or masculinity.60 While this 
may not have, originally, equated to the deliberate heteronormalizing of a 
commemorative narrative, the Anzac Day commemorative tone was—and continues to 
be—defiantly male, straight, and masculine. 
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When asked to clarify the characteristics of the hero being valorised in Australia, Ben 
brings the effects of the above narrative on the everyday inclinations of Australians into 
view, which he links to both the armed forces and to sport: 
 
Yeah, well, it’s very... It’s very much, I guess, kind of, alpha male, going out there 
and winning at whatever he’s doing or [laughs] killing people [ . . . ] Growing up, 
most of our bogans are all the ones with huge muscles trying to beat people up and 
it’s all ridiculous and you look at it and you think, they’re idiots but everyone really 
wants to be that person, I guess, don’t they? [ . . . ] They, you know. I’ve seen a 
couple of the rugby league players at the local bar in Brisbane and they’re always 
hitting people and being idiots and then you, like, watch them on tv and you’re 
like, oh, I love you. So, it’s all a bit stupid but, you know, that’s what we love, so. 
 
Of course, this quote suggests a masculinist challenge to the law, not least in terms of the 
veneration of those committing acts of violence as the larrikin, boorish but respected. It 
takes on an added layer in relation to the substantive sense of belonging and comfort 
beyond formalised sexual equalities when the macho disposition is considered the reason 
for homophobia. When asked why people think so disparagingly of homosexuality in 
Australia, and where that might come from, John suggests that ‘everyone knows a gay 
person, whether they uh, uh, know it, and at this stage, knows an out gay person. So that’s 
not, I don’t think [ignorance] today would be a reason for the gay bashings, except, except 
for that Australian macho thing.’ 
 
Elasticity and tolerance 
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Staying with John, and in the context of a masculinist challenge to law, I’d like to return 
to an observation he previously made, about feeling safer because the police were on his 
side in New South Wales. As important as the police were, being symbolic of the legal 
protection offered, was John’s own robustness: 
 
They all were [homophobic killings], and we knew they were, and you would still 
go there [to a cruising stretch between Bondi and Tamarama], but I, I was 
enormous, so I was never really worried. It was, it still felt safer than Queensland, 
if that makes sense. But it did, it honestly felt safer because at least the police were 
on your side and, and you were, you were a legal entity. 
 
His ability to satisfy a particular norm (of size and muscularity) within the masculinist 
idea was a source of comfort and safety. While this fits within the familiar truism that 
persecution, intimidation, and aggression is often reserved for people perceived to be 
weaker, it does also suggest that a depiction of strength and ‘macho, macho, butch’ is a 
condition of protection. This speaks, provisionally, to the elastic quality of identity norms. 
In other words, it speaks to the notion that identity norms are, broadly, demanding of 
consistency or uniformity but tolerant of diversity which can still be captured and 
rationalised as belonging within the paradigmatic identity logics. This follows Vanessa 
May’s suggestion that belonging is, to some degree, a matter of conducting oneself in an 
acceptable manner before others.61 The importance of appearing as, crudely, the ‘right 
sort of gay man’ or as a comparably reasonable ‘level’ of gay by adopting a masculine 
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aesthetic62 demonstrates that belonging is contingent on a perception that certain 
characteristics need to be conformed to in order to be tolerated. 
 
What emerges from each of the interviews, in one way or another, is exactly this. Each 
participant places importance on satisfying elements of the perceived masculine 
standard, not least because they associate identifying with their sexuality with the social 
association of homosexuality and undesirable effeminacy. This idea of ‘doing 
masculinity’63 accords with instances of cultural representations of homosexuality being 
negotiated and sanitised so as to avoid disaffecting heterosexual men.64 For instance, 
Zackary reflected on the pride he felt over certain comments about his sexuality: 
 
A common one I would hear from people was, I’m glad you’re not an obvious gay, 
you know? It’s not necessarily a, something to be proud of, but I was, at the same 
time. […] Does that make sense [laughing]? As if it’s, um, something to be prized. 
Masculinity is something to be prized.  Does that make sense? So, I should be proud 
of myself. I’m the right sort of gay man. So yeah, actually growing up I made a 
concerted effort, and partly subconscious I’m sure, to be the opposite of the, the 
common stereotype. 
 
If the desire to make himself more socially acceptable, or others more comfortable with 
him, was Zackary’s aim, Clark’s concern was much more a matter of family acceptance. 
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He would regularly recount the importance of masculinity within the family and it is 
instructive that he would say, in relation to the present, ‘now, on the other end, I’m like, 
yeah, I’m a little bit more athletic, and [my sexuality] doesn’t matter.’ Such undertakings 
can be considered ‘compensatory manhood acts’65 which enable people to emphasise 
‘masculine’ traits and satisfy elements of hegemonic or normalised masculinity. Owen, 
for instance ‘did the whole cliché’ of coming out as bisexual so it was ‘not such a rude 
shock’ to others who could still associate with him as ‘half-gay’. 
 
This act of concealing sexuality in order to pass as heterosexual, be more accepted within 
friendship groups and family, or as a sense of necessity for safety in a heterosexist climate 
each imply ‘a normative formation which makes homosexuality more acceptable vis à vis 
heteronormative society.’66 João Manuel de Oliveira, Carlos Gonçalves Costa, and 
Conceição Nogueira suggest that strategizing to pass oneself off as straight is one aspect 
of homonormativity, but that it also depends on an uncritical acceptance of the neoliberal 
‘postgay’ paradigm and a desire to be included within heterosexist institutions. This is 
what Lisa Duggan terms, the new homonormativity, which depends on understanding 
neoliberalism as a non-politics but is, all the same, ‘a politics that does not contest 
dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them 
while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, 
depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.’67 
 
While the interviewees in this study are not necessarily, deliberately engaging this 
depoliticisation of homosexuality directly, many do tie social progress to the institution 
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of marriage equality, identifying the time it took to establish this equality in law as an 
example of how ‘backwards’ Australia is. Duggan’s notion that homonormative ‘equality’ 
is coded as ‘narrow, formal access to a few conservatizing institutions’68 is instructive 
here. In relation to marriage, this equality is problematic because the law is fed into the 
process making some formulations of non-heteronormative relationships respectable 
and recognisable.69 Indeed, ‘while legislation against homophobia, the adoption of non-
discrimination clauses, and the extension of marriage rights have produced official 
“equalities” landscapes for sexual minorities . . . these forms of sexual legitimation have 
been socially and spatially uneven.’70 
 
Here, the role of Anzac Day, and the militarisation of Australian-ness, can be reintroduced 
as a quasi-legal institution which helps create those undulations in the legal landscape. 
The allowance for gay servicepeople, as a fillip of the non-politics of homonormativity,71 
means that the presencing of homosexuals within the Anzac legend can begin to happen, 
slowly.72 However, the idea that greater recognition of homosexuality can be achieved 
through Anzac presumes that militarised recognition is fundamentally positive and 
progressive. Or, more seriously, that the recognition of homosexuality is mediated by 
militarism, to the degree that militarism is proving there are macho homosexuals, not 
that homosexuality is fundamentally accepted: as Aaron says, ‘obviously, armed forces 
being macho, macho, butchy guys, they don’t want to have some queen running and going, 
yeah –funny. But not all of them are.’ 
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The recognition of the value of homosexuals who are also archetypal patriots in the 
protection of—and in the case of Anzac Day, the conception of—the nation is on the basis 
of their generativity and ability to fit the rationalised conceptualisation of ‘the nation as 
a growing child . . . used to invoke the logic of progress and development.’73 Narratives 
which exist outside of the progression of drawing out lessons from an identifiable point 
of origin exist outside the constructed rationality of the commemorative narrative. This 
is comparable to the acceptability of gay marriage as an inculcation of heteronormativity 
on non-straight relationships as it presupposes the ‘normative image of genetically 
related families in which two parents in “loving relationships” raise children.’74 This is 
one thing Shawn mentions, when rationalising his sister’s eventual acceptance of his 
homosexuality: ‘if I want kids, I can still have kids. It’s just a different way I’ve got to go 
about it.’  
 
As Damien Riggs and Clemence Due identify, the privileging of this image is racially 
normative.75 Moreover, the marriage debate diverts attention from: 
 
the existence of broader and more complex underlying political issues, such as 
entanglements of policies touching on race, class and choice . . . [meaning] the 
advantages of same-sex marriage are tangible for middle and upper classes who 
already enjoy some forms of economic security.76 
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The ideal of the militarised, masculine norm within Anzac Day, to which the right sort of 
homosexual can be admitted, is also racialised, where ‘the production of (certain 
homonormative, liberal) queers as being “closer” to the nation than other subjects, both 
queer and non-queer’ is ‘most obviously demonstrated by the inclusion of gays and 
lesbians in the reproductive futurism of marriage, or the acceptance of LGB people in the 
army.’77 The racialised texture of this is directly referenced by Clark, who introduces the 
typification of the Anzac as ‘a mousy-brown-haired, blue-eyes, white-skinned male.’ The 
elasticity—ie the degree of tolerance—of the legal and political order to recognise 
difference is, as such, tempered by legal provisions (eg marriage equality) and quasi-legal 
institutions (eg the commemoration of the Anzacs) which recognise certain forms of 
homosexuality, so long as they conform to normative ideas of kinship, family, desire for 
reproduction, and ‘full’ economic life.78  
 
As such, marriage equality, and the inclusion of certain impressions of valued non-
heteronormativity is a homonormative fait accompli which is buttressed by quasi-legal 
institutions that also present similarly valued traits to be conformed to in exchange for 
recognition and belonging within an ostensibly progressive society. This progressive 
agenda of the ‘postgay’ era, which is more accurately an era of tolerating sexual minorities 
who conform as much as possible to the social order,79 nurtures ‘yet another binary 
where difference and normalization are, once again, implemented and reproduced.’80 The 
tranquilising effect of the complicit legal and quasi-legal orders on political engagement 
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is articulated starkly by Duggan: ‘we have been administered a kind of political sedative—
we get marriage and the military and then we go home and cook dinner, forever.’81 
 
Conclusion 
The dynamism of senses of belonging reinforces the importance of acknowledging that 
law interacts with a plurality of competing and complementary social and ideological 
systems.82 Indeed, the operability of statutes within a legal community which appear 
progressive encounter, are challenged by, and take on particular meanings as a result of 
the involvement of other apparatuses which function ‘as a symbolic mark of distinction 
of groups that are not included within a community.’83 The central argument of this paper 
has been that we must pay due attention to the affective foundations of law, which 
includes the normalising and formalising quality of commemorative narratives, helping 
to demarcate the boundaries of belonging and unbelonging, particularly in relation to 
homosexuality in Australia.  
 
Indeed, we should be cognisant of the fact that, ‘while the discourse of law can serve, and 
serve well, to redress social injustices and subjects of legal discourse are savvy and 
capable of negotiating legal systems even as they are subject to their disciplinary forces, 
[we should] destabilise the measuring of social change and of “progress” in terms of 
legalisation.’84 For instance, Shawn identified the unequivocal value of marriage reform 
as an example of ‘Australia [being] more forward-thinking than [he] was beginning to 
think’. However, this ostensibly progressive moment cannot necessarily be tied with 
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actual social progress. As Duggan warns, passing the politics of sexual difference through 
the prism of legal equality stifles an expansive and critical queer politics. Shawn himself 
reflects this point when he intimates that familial acceptance of his sexuality may well be 
tied to him preserving the generative norm and his ability to still satisfy the ‘typically 
nuclear family idea’, married with children. Moreover, the above analysis suggests that 
the uncritical assumption of progress in formal equality can readily be mobilised within 
sexually exceptionalist and nationalistic politics.85 
 
Rather than necessarily depending on law to supersede a problematic legal and political 
climate, alternative frames of normativity beyond official legal frameworks can 
potentially offer an emancipatory space ‘in which one can experiment with and engage in, 
at least to a degree, social relations free from the grip of legality’86 as law cannot be relied 
upon as an adequate means of resistance. If a normative claim is to be made here, it is that 
a truly progressive agenda must be allied with contesting the narratives and values which 
derive from quasi-legal institutions such as collective commemorative events. In the 
context of Anzac Day, this means challenging the conflation of homosexuality with the 
transgression of the masculine and militaristic foundations of Australian values. 
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